By Jessica Y. Washington, J.D.
A Muslim medical assistant’s claim of religious discrimination failed where the health center that employed her could prove that her termination resulted from her violation of the health center’s clearly communicated Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) ( P.L. 104-191) policies, and not her religious beliefs or practices, a New York court ruled in a slip opinion. The medical assistant failed to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination and the health center successfully demonstrated that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for terminating the medical assistant based on her inappropriate access of patient medical records. The health center clearly stated in its compliance program manual (a copy of which had been provided to the medical assistant upon her hiring) that any such violations would result in immediate dismissal. ( Hababi v. Lutheran Medical Center, December 16, 2016, Martin, L.).
Background. Lutheran Medical Center determined that a medical assistant accessed the records of a patient for whom she was not caring after hours and terminated her in accordance with its HIPAA polices. The Muslim employee brought an action against Lutheran based on claims of religious discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The health center moved for summary judgment on all counts.
Religious discrimination. An employee establishing a prima facie case for religious discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) must demonstrate, in addition to other requirements, that her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. In order to prevail on summary judgment, an employer must demonstrate the employee’s failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, having offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their challenged actions, the absence of a material issue of facts as to whether their explanations were pretextual. The medical assistant alleged that throughout her employment with the health center, she had been subjected to unlawful employment practices and repeated acts of discrimination as a result of her national origin and religion, including offensive comments about her hijab, Muslims, and Arabs allegedly made by the site director and other employees. The court found that the medical assistant failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the religious discrimination claim, finding that Lutheran provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her dismissal—i.e., that she accessed patient records on two occasions without authorization, which substantiated suspicions that the medical assistant had disclosed private health information to a third party—and noting that she was hired because of her ability to speak and translate Arabic and that she, her predecessor, and eventual successor were all Muslim and wore hijabs. The court granted the health center’s summary judgment on this count.
Hostile work environment. In order to establish a claim for hostile work environment in violation of Executive Law Sec. 296 or Administrative Code Sec. 8-107, an employee must show that the workplace was "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the employee’s employment and create an abusive working environment." The frequency and severity of the discrimination, whether the allegedly discriminatory actions were threatening or humiliating or mere offensive utterance, and whether the alleged actions unreasonably interfere with an employee’s work, factor into a court’s assessment. The medical assistant alleged that on more than one occasion, she complained about the alleged offensive and discriminatory incidents to the site director but that he failed to investigate or take remedial action. The site director denied making discriminatory comments to the medical assistant about her hijab and stated that the medical assistant never complained to him about any mistreatment. Due to the conflicting claims of the parties, the court found that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the medical assistant was subjected to a hostile work environment, and denied the health center’s motion for summary judgment on this count.
Retaliation. The medical assistant alleged that the health center retaliated against her (i.e., increased her workload, often preventing her from taking lunch breaks) after she complained to the site director about alleged discriminatory acts. She claimed that the health center’s ultimate decision to dismiss her was in retaliation for her complaints. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation pursuant to Executive Law Sec. 296 or Administrative Code Sec. 8-107, an employee must show that: (1) she was engaged in protected activity, (2) her employer was aware that she participated in such activity, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action based on her activity, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. The court found that, as a matter of law, no triable issue of fact exists as to whether the adverse employment action suffered by the medical assistant was based on her violation of company policy rather than an act of retaliation. The court further stated that the medical assistant cannot "avoid summary judgment by merely pointing to the inference of causality resulting from the sequence in time of the events." Accordingly, the court granted the health center’s motion for summary judgment on this count.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress. The medical assistant alleged that the health center and its employees engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused her severe mental, emotional, and psychological distress. In order to substantiate a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the employee must show that the alleged conduct was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to be beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The court found the health center’s motion for summary judgment to be moot on this count due to the latter’s failure to address the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in its moving papers.